Cornell Law Review
Volume 71
Issue 5 July 1986

Article 3

Judicial Review of Fiduciary Claim Denials Under
ERISA: An Alternative to the Arbitrary and
Capricious Test
Bradley R. Duncan

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Bradley R. Duncan, Judicial Review of Fiduciary Claim Denials Under ERISA: An Alternative to the Arbitrary and Capricious Test ,
71 Cornell L. Rev. 986 (1986)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol71/iss5/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FIDUCIARY CLAIM DENIALS
UNDER ERISA: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS TEST

INTRODUCTION

The passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA)' marked Congress's first effort at comprehensive
control over employee benefit plans. Prior to ERISA, employee
benefit plans "constitute[d] the only large private accumulation of
funds which ha[d] escaped the imprimatur of effective federal regulation. ' 2 To this end, ERISA introduced a variety of regulatory innovations. The most striking were ERISA's reporting and
disclosure requirements, 3 the establishment of minimum participation and vesting standards for qualified plans, 4 the institution of
minimum funding requirements, 5 and the creation of federal standards governing the conduct of fiduciaries in control of such plans. 6
This Note addresses the last of these major innovations, the
regulation of fiduciary behavior. Specifically, it examines how
courts review a pivotal area of fiduciary activity: the fiduciary's denial of a benefit claim. 7 Courts currently review claim denial decisions using an "arbitrary and capricious" test. Under this test, "the
actions of the trustees in the administration of the pension plan
must be sustained as a matter of law unless [the claimant] can prove
8
such activities have been arbitrary or capricious."

I Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 and in
scattered sections of the I.R.C. (1982)).
2 H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1973) [hereinafter cited as HousE
REPORT], rerintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 4641.

3 ERISA §§ 101-111, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1982).
4 Id. §§ 201-211, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061 (1982).
5 Id. §§ 301-306, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (1982).
6 Id. §§ 401-414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1982).
7 For purposes of this Note, the term "fiduciary" shall be used interchangeably
with the terms "trustee" and "administrator." These terms refer to the individuals who
exercise discretion in deciding whether to deny a benefit claim.
8 Bayles v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 602 F.2d 97, 99 (5th
Cir. 1979). Each of the federal circuits has adopted the arbitrary and capricious test for
review of benefit claim denials. See, e.g., Palino v. Casey, 664 F.2d 854, 858 (1st Cir.
1981); Miles v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund Employee Pension Benefit Plan, 698 F.2d 593, 599 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829
(1983); Struble v. New Jersey Brewery Employees' Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325,
333 (3d Cir. 1984); Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1006 (4th Cir. 1985);
Bayles, 602 F.2d at 99; Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co. Retirement Program for Salaried
Employees, 740 F.2d 454, 457 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 786 (1985); Pokratz
v. Jones Dairy Farm, 771 F.2d 206, 208 (7th Cir. 1985); Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d
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This Note traces the origins of the arbitrary and capricious test
and evaluates the test's role in judicial enforcement of ERISA's fiduciary provisions. This Note concludes that the test, as now applied
to benefit claim denials, is inconsistent with both the fundamental
policies of ERISA and the prevailing theory of employee benefit
plans, the deferred compensation theory. This Note proposes instead an actuarially based test.9 This test would sustain an administrator's claim denial under two circumstances: (1) when the denial is
based upon an unambiguous, trustee-adopted' o plan provision and
the administrator can show an actuarial need for the provision; or
(2) when the denial is based upon ambiguous plan language and the
administrator can show that adoption of the claimant's reasonable
reading would pose an actuarial threat to the plan's health. This
actuarial test accords more directly with ERISA's protective intent
by limiting an administrator's power to deny benefit claims. Moreover, by concentrating judicial review of fiduciary claim denials
upon actuarial factors, the test reduces the inherent conflict between the sometimes necessary evil of benefit denials and the theory
that all employees enjoy an entitlement to benefits as deferred
compensation.
1320, 1321 (8th Cir. 1981); Harm v. Bay Area Pipe Trades Pension Plan Trust Fund,
701 F.2d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1983); Peckham v. Board of Trustees of the Int'l Bhd. of
Painters Union, 653 F.2d 424, 426 (10th Cir. 1981); Helms v. Monsanto Co., 728 F.2d
1416, 1420 (1lth Cir. 1984); Maggard v. O'Connell, 671 F.2d 568, 571 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
9 The term "actuarial" is used throughout this Note in a broad, nontechnical manner, referring only to a plan's ability to satisfy its long-term benefit obligations with
respect to qualified participants. All employee benefit plans are established and funded
according to the characteristics of a specific plan population. As used here the term
"actuarial" shall refer to the correlation between the level of plan funding and the costs
that the plan's intended population is expected to impose. The term does not refer to
any specific means of computing a plan's obligations. For a discussion of particular actuarial cost methods, see D. McGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 332-62 (3d
ed. 1975).
10 The proposed test would only apply when the plan trustees unilaterally adopted
the provision which generated the denial. It does not apply when the challenged provision is the product of collective bargaining. The Supreme Court held in United Mine
Workers Health & Retirement Funds v. Robinson, 455 U.S. 562 (1982), that such collectively bargained provisions need not satisfy any standard of reasonableness. Thus, when
a trustee denies a claim pursuant to an unambiguous, collectively bargained provision,
Robinson holds that the trustee has breached no fiduciary duty, despite the provision's
possible irrationality. Id. at 574. For a discussion of Robinson, see 1981-1982 Annual
Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law, 24 B.C.L. REV. 47, 152-61
(1982). The result in Robinson seems appropriate, given that trustees who merely implement an unambiguous, collectively bargained provision do not exercise the type of discretion that lies at the heart of ERISA's fiduciary provisions. See infra note 11. Such is
not the case, however, when trustees interpret an ambiguous plan provision. In such instances ERISA's fiduciary provisions are clearly implicated, and the proposed test's second prong would apply regardless of whether the provision was collectively bargained
or unilaterally adopted.
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I
ERISA's FIDUCIARY PROVISIONS AND STANDARDS OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW

ERISA provides express comprehensive standards for the regulation of fiduciary behavior. In reviewing fiduciary benefit denials,
however, courts have departed from these express provisions and
have applied an arbitrary and capricious test. Part I describes that
departure. Further, it traces the origins of the arbitrary and capricious test and shows, by way of example, the inconsistency with
which courts currently apply the test.
A.

Regulation of Fiduciaries Under ERISA

ERISA's fiduciary provisions" govern the entire range of a
trustee's plan-related behavior. A long history of fiduciary misuse of
plan resources, coupled with the impotence of prior legislation directed at such fiduciary misconduct, 12 prompted enactment of the
standards. The heart of ERISA's fiduciary treatment is section
404(a)(1), which imposes strict duties of care and loyalty upon plan
fiduciaries. This section requires that fiduciaries discharge their duties "solely in the interest" of plan participants and beneficiaries;
that they act "for the exclusive purpose" of providing benefits to
participants and their beneficiaries; and that they act with the care
and skill of a "prudent man" in like circumstances. 13 The particular
ERISA defines a fiduciary as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), a person is a fiduciary
with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or
exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition
of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of
such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has
any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan. Such term includes any person designated under
section 1105(c)(1)(B) of this title [establishing the allocation of fiduciary
duties].
ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1982).
11

12
13

See infra note 69.
Section 404(a)(1), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1982), provides:
§ 1104. Fiduciary duties
(a) Prudent man standard of care
(1) Subject to sections 1103(c) and (d), 1342, and 1344 of this title,
a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in
the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the
plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a
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language establishing section 404(a)(1)'s fiduciary standards derives
from the common law of trusts. 14 Congress incorporated that language in ERISA expressly intending "that courts ... interpret the
prudent man rule and other fiduciary standards bearing in mind the
special nature and purposes of employee benefit plans."' 5
Although the above language is rather cryptic-it is unclear
precisely what "special nature and purposes" Congress had in
mind-Congress certainly saw ERISA as a mandate to the federal
courts to fashion an entirely new body of federal employee benefit
law.' 6 This new body of law was designed to depart from the preERISA "abuses and unsound practices which jeopardize[d] the security of [plan] assets and threaten[ed] the availability of funds for
7
employees."'
The federal courts have followed Congress's mandate and in
the last decade have constructed an impressive body of case law relating to a fiduciary's discretionary behavior. Essential to an understanding of this case law is the recognition that courts have
like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in
the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with
like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of this subchapter
or subchapter III of this chapter.
14 See HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 11, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 4649 ("The fiduciary responsibility section, in essence, codifies and makes applicable to . . . fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of
trusts."). Despite applying elements of the common law of trusts, Congress intended
ERISA's fiduciary provisions to depart from that field of law. For example, the common
law of trusts permits a trust agreement to shield a fiduciary, via an exculpatory clause,
from any liability for misuse of trust assets. ERISA's fiduciary provisions, on the other
hand, specifically override such exculpatory dauses. See ERISA § 410, 29 U.S.C. § 1110
(1982).
15
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 12, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 4650.
16 ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982), strongly supports this idea. It
reads, "Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar
as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section
1003(a) of this title ... ." Id. See also Helms v. Monsanto Co., 728 F.2d 1416, 1419 (11th
Cir. 1984) ("The language in § 1144 is broad, indicating Congress' intent to preempt
the entire field of law involving employee benefit plans subject to ERISA."); Wadsworth
v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 77 (1st Cir. 1977) ("The legislative history [of ERISA]
manifests that Congress intended to preempt all state laws that relate to employee benefit
plans and not just state laws which purport to regulate an area expressly covered by
ERISA."), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978).
17
1 SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE,
94T CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURrry AcT OF 1974, at 204 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
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bifurcated the cases challenging a fiduciary's exercise of discretion
into two broad categories. The first category includes cases challenging a fiduciary's honesty or skill in managing plan assets. The
second category comprises cases which assail a fiduciary's administration of the plan with respect to its participants and beneficiaries.
This latter category encompasses challenges to fiduciary actions
which have the effect of a benefit denial.' 8 Courts have scrutinized
the first category, cases which attack a fiduciary's investment behavior, according to the express language of section 404(a)(1). 19 For
example, in Donovan v. Bierwirth20 the Second Circuit evaluated the
allegations of pension plan participants that the plan's trustees had
violated the express language of section 404(a)(1) by investing plan
funds in stock of the employer corporation. The court held for the
participants, finding that because the investment was primarily intended to thwart a hostile tender offer, and not to further the health
of the plan, the trustees had violated section 404(a)(1)'s express loy21
alty and prudence requirements.
The second category of cases challenging fiduciary behavior,
and the focus of this Note, involves plan administration. Typically,
these cases challenge a fiduciary's exercise of discretion in denying a
benefit claim. 22 Broadly speaking, a fiduciary may exercise his discretion to deny a benefit claim in two ways. The first and most obvious way is by interpreting plan eligibility requirements in close cases
so as to exclude a claimant from receiving his benefits. The second,
less apparent exercise of discretion involves adopting eligibility provisions which later form the basis for a benefit denial. In both cases
the fiduciary's discretionary decision leads to the denial of benefits,
although in the former he is presently deciding an individual case, and
in the latter he has previously decided, by adopting the exclusionary
18 See Struble v. NewJersey Brewery Employees' Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325,
333 (3d Cir. 1984) (discussing judicial review of these two broad categories of fiduciary
activity).
19 See, e.g., Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 279 (2d Cir.) (trustees violated
§ 404(a)(1)'s express prudence requirements in lending plan assets and administering
loans), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 565 (1984); Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467
(5th Cir. 1983) (administrators of ERISA regulated employee stock ownership plan violated § 404(a)(1) by selling stock for inadequate consideration), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1251 (1984).
20
680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982).
21
680 F.2d at 276. The court specifically invoked the "solely in the interest," "exclusive purpose," and "prudence" aspects of § 404(a)(1), and determined that under the
circumstances the trustees' behavior violated each of these "overlapping standards." Id.
at 271.
22
Administering a pension plan includes duties other than deciding benefit daims,
such as record keeping and filing annual reports. For purposes of reviewing fiduciary
behavior, however, the benefit decision is the most important administrative responsibility, and is the focus of this Note.
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provision, that a particular class of claimants should not receive
23
benefits.
In contrast to the analysis applied to fiduciary investment behavior, courts reviewing fiduciary decisions on benefit claim matters
have not felt bound by section 404(a)(1)'s express language. Instead, they have reviewed such decisions under the highly deferential "arbitrary and capricious" test. The Sixth Circuit described the
scope and source of this test in Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co. Retirement
Programfor SalariedEmployees:
[O]nce a plan is established and is governed by the requirements
of ERISA, courts may review a decision by trustees to deny benefits ....

Such review, however, is limited to a determination of

whether the trustees' actions in administering or interpreting a
plan's provisions are arbitrary and capricious. Courts may review
the trustees' administration of a pension plan because Congress
has imposed a fiduciary duty upon trustees to administer such
plans for the sole and exclusive benefit of the beneficiaries. 29
24
U.S.C. Sec. 1104 [ERISA section 404(a)].
The arbitrary and capricious test appears nowhere within ERISA itself;25 indeed, the statute's fiduciary provisions do not expressly address the benefit denial situation. Courts have
nonetheless construed section 404(a) (1)'s broad language2 6 to regulate all forms of fiduciary behavior, including a fiduciary's denial of a
benefit claim. As the Moore case illustrates, most courts rest their
authority to review fiduciary benefit denials upon section 404(a)(1)'s
"solely in the interest" and "exclusive purpose" language. 27 That
Congress intended the courts to review fiduciaries' decisions regarding benefit denials is confirmed by ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B).
That section defines the parties empowered to bring a civil action to
23
The distinction between these two methods of denying benefits underlies the two
prongs of the proposed test for judicial review of benefit denials presented infra in part
III. Moreover, it explains the interaction between the proposed test and the decision in
United Mine Workers Health & Retirement Funds v. Robinson, 455 U.S. 562 (1982),
discussed supra note 10.
24 740 F.2d 454, 457 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 786 (1985).
25 See, e.g., Winpisinger v. Aurora Corp., 456 F. Supp. 559, 567 (N.D. Ohio 1978)
("This pre-ERISA test ofjudicial review [the arbitrary and capricious test] is not implicitly approved or rejected by any part of ERISA.").
26 See supra note 13.
27 See, e.g., Northeast Dep't ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund v. Teamsters Local
Union No. 229 Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing § 404(a)(1),
court stated that "a decision of trustees denying benefits to participants or beneficiaries
meets the requirements of § [404] unless that decision is arbitrary and capricious");
Palino v. Casey, 664 F.2d 854, 857 (1st Cir. 1981) (Citing § 404(a)(1), the court stated
that "ERISA imposes on trustees of funds ... a fiduciary duty to manage the fund with
prudence and in the interest of the fund's participants and beneficiaries." The court
then reviewed a trustee's decision to amend the plan in a way that excluded a claimant
from benefits.).
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enforce ERISA's provisions, and states that a plan participant or
beneficiary may bring an action "to recover benefits due to him
under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of
the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of
28
the plan."
ERISA thus permits judicial review of benefit claim denials, and
provides substantive standards against which fiduciary behavior
might be measured. Nonetheless, courts review a fiduciary's decision to deny a benefit using a standard not found within the statute
itself. The question arises: what is the source of the arbitrary and
capricious test, and why have courts chosen to apply it instead of
section 404(a)(1)'s express provisions?
B.

Origins of ERISA's Arbitrary and Capricious Test

ERISA's arbitrary and capricious test finds its immediate roots
in the "structural defect" analysis that courts developed to review
the benefit decisions of fiduciaries of plans created pursuant to section 302(c)(5) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
(LMRA).2 9 Prior to ERISA, LMRA section 302(c)(5) provided the
primary vehicle for federal regulation of pension plan structure and
administration. Applicable only to union-negotiated pension trusts,
section 302 forbids all employer payments to labor representatives
other than those to be applied to a bona fide pension trust fund.
Once made, these payments must be used for "the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees . . . and their families and
30
dependents."
Despite the imposition of this "sole and exclusive benefit" obligation, section 302(c)(5) does not expressly authorize enforcement
against individualplan fiduciaries.3 1 Under section 302(c) (5) a claimant may allege that the plan itself, as structured, violates the "sole and
exclusive benefit" requirement.8 2 The statute does not authorize,
28 ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1982). This section contrasts
with § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (1982), which permits the Secretary of Labor, a
plan participant, or a fiduciary to bring an action to recover profits a fiduciary receives
from an improper investment or transaction involving plan assets. ERISA thus includes
two parallel provisions creating causes of action, one intended to redress fiduciary
breaches in the investment context, and the other to recover benefits. Existence of the
latter strongly implies Congress intended ERISA's fiduciary provisions to apply to the
benefit claim situation.
29 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1982).
30
Id.
81
See Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 427 (1959) ("The legislative history
[of § 302(c)(5)] is devoid of any suggestion that defalcating trustees were to be held
accountable under federal law, except by way of the injunctive remedy provided in that
subsection.").
32
See Burroughs v. Board of Trustees of the Pension Trust Fund for Operating
Eng'rs, 542 F.2d 1128, 1130 (9th Cir. 1976) ("Section 302(e) grants district courtsjuris-
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however, a direct attack upon the misconduct of individual fiducia33
ries administering the plan.
To circumvent this flaw in section 302(c)(5), courts developed
the "structural defect" theory, a backdoor means of asserting juris34
diction over the alleged misconduct of the fiduciaries themselves.
Under the "structural defect" analysis, courts require a claimant to
demonstrate that a particular plan provision has denied him benefits
in an "arbitrary and capricious" manner.3 5 If a claimant can show
that a plan provision produces such arbitrary and capricious treatment, courts conclude that the plan has not been established for the
"sole and exclusive benefit" of its participants.3 6 This failure implies a "structural" deficiency in the plan, which allows courts to
review, under the same arbitrary and capricious test, the fiduciaries'
37
conduct in enforcing the offending provision.
The key, therefore, to judicial review of an individual fiduciary's
claim decision under LMRA section 302(c)(5) is an initial finding
that a claimant's benefits have been denied arbitrarily or capriciously. Application of that standard, via the "structural defect"
analysis, is in turn closely linked to section 302(c)(5)'s "sole and exclusive benefit" language. Thus, when Congress subsequently
adopted similar language to define ERISA's fiduciary obligations,
diction to determine whether the provisions of a given retirement fund constitute a
structural defect in violation of § 302(c)(5)."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977).
33
542 F.2d at 1130. See also Wilson v. Board of Trustees of the Pension Trust Fund
for Operating Eng'rs, 564 F.2d 1299, 1300 (9th Cir. 1977) (Section 302(e) jurisdiction
"does not extend to day-to-day fiduciary administration of welfare and pension funds.");
Beam v. International Org. of Masters, 511 F.2d 975, 978 (2d Cir. 1975) ("we have
found no case describing a federal substantive standard for review of fiduciaries' determination of an individual claim brought pursuant to ajointly-administered welfare trust
fund created pursuant to Section 302(c)(5) of the [LMRA]").
34 See Comment, The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard Under ERISA: Its Origins and
Application, 23 DuO. L. REv. 1033, 1035-41 (1985) (describing evolution of arbitrary and
capricious test under LMRA § 302(c)(5)).
35 Id.
36 Id. See also Insley v.Joyce, 330 F. Supp. 1228, 1234 (N.D. Ill. 1971) ("It seems
obvious.., that arbitrary and capricious eligibility provisions might be violative of the
structural requirement that the [LMRA § 302] trust be for the sole and exclusive benefit
of the employees.").
37 See Comment, supra note 34, at 1040. Several courts never accepted the argument that § 302(c)(5) created a federal cause of action to enforce the "solely in interest"
requirement. These courts rejected the circuitous "structural defect" rationale as a
means of establishing continuingjurisdiction over fiduciary behavior. See, e.g., Fiorelli v.
Kelewer, 339 F. Supp. 796, 801 (E.D. Pa. 1972) ("To the extent that plaintiffs argue for
the existence of an independent federal remedy to correct trust funds that do not operate
to the sole and exclusive benefit of employees they have ... failed to state a cause of
action [under § 302(c)(5)] .... Although this Court is sensitive to the equities of the
plaintiff's claim it is of the opinion that they would be better addressed to a state forum."), aft'd, 474 F.2d 1340 (3d Cir. 1973). See also Haley v. Platnick, 378 F. Supp. 499
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on othergrounds sub nom. Haley v. Palatnik, 509 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir.
1975).
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many courts saw therein an intent to perpetuate the arbitrary and
38
capricious test for review of benefit claim denials under ERISA.
The Third Circuit described judicial thinking on the point in Struble
v. New Jersey Brewery Employees' Welfare Trust Fund:
The "arbitrary and capricious" standard derives from section
302(c) (5) of the LMRA. That section imposes a duty of loyalty on
section 302 trustees by permitting employer contributions to a
welfare trust fund only if the contributions are used "for the sole
and exclusive benefit of the employees .

. . ."

Section 1104 of

ERISA imposes a similar duty of loyalty, and not surprisingly the
courts have applied the "arbitrary and capricious" standard under
9
3
ERISA as well.

C.

Current Judicial Application of the Arbitrary and Capricious
Test

Origins aside, 40 the arbitrary and capricious test is firmly entrenched as the standard of review for fiduciary benefit claim decisions under ERISA. 41 Broad acceptance of the test, however, has
38 At least one early commentator, however, suggested that the difference between
the language in ERISA § 404(a)(1) and that in LMRA § 302(c)(5)-"exclusive purpose

of providing benefits" versus "exclusive benefit"-demonstrates an effort to impose
more rigorous standards upon fiduciaries under ERISA, so as to avoid the failures of
LMRA regulation. See Note, FiduciaryStandards Under The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 63 GEo. L.J. 1109, 1116 (1975).
39 732 F.2d 325, 333 (3d Cir. 1984). In a strict sense, it is inaccurate to state that
courts do not apply § 404(a)(1)'s express language when reviewing fiduciary benefit denials. As the Struble quote shows, courts use § 404(a)(1)'s "solely in the interest" language as a starting point for review of denials, but employ the arbitrary and capricious
test to determine whether a claim denial was "solely in the interest." See also supra notes
24-27 and accompanying text. Courts, in essence, use the arbitrary and capricious test
to provide the substance for the "solely in the interest" inquiry. A link thus exists, however attenuated, between § 404(a)(1)'s express language and the arbitrary and capricious test.
40
In adopting § 302(c)(5)'s arbitrary and capricious test to review benefit denials
under ERISA, most courts overlook the conditions, outlined above, under which the test
originated. The "structural defect" analysis represented an effort by courts to review
fiduciary behavior where no clear statutory authority for such review existed. As such,
review under § 302(c)(5) was necessarily tentative, for the statute's failings placed an
unavoidable restraint upon the level of judicial scrutiny chosen. ERISA, on the other
hand, provides both explicit standards and enforcement mechanisms for review of fiduciary behavior. See supra note 13. This contrast-between the questionable (if not fictional) basis for review under the LMRA and ERISA's unambiguous grant of review
authority-weakens the argument for perpetuating § 302(c)(5)'s arbitrary and capricious
test under ERISA. See also infra part II. Nonetheless, most courts look only to the two
statutes' facial similarities and, after a cursory inquiry, conclude that the arbitrary and
capricious test is the proper standard under ERISA. See, e.g., supra note 39 and accompanying text.
41
See Gilbert, The Responsibilities and Liabilitiesof Fiduciaries Under ERISA-A Ten-Year
Anniversary Review, 43 INST. ON FED. TAx'N § 33, at 33-18 (1985) (describing universality
of arbitrary and capricious test); see also supra note 8 and cases cited therein.
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not produced uniformity, either in the way the test is applied or in
the results reached thereunder. The nature of the test itself largely
causes this failure. In the abstract, the test lacks substance; its language commands only an undefined deference to a fiduciary's decision. 4 2 To limit that deference and apply the test in a reasoned
manner, courts have had to supply the test's substance. Unfortunately, courts have been notably inconsistent in articulating the
questions to be asked under an arbitrary and capricious review.
Consequently, the test varies by jurisdiction, causing different
43
courts to reach different results in virtually identical cases.
For example, the test's substance often varies according to the
nature of the claim denial. Courts reviewing denials based upon a
fiduciary's interpretation of plan language frequently consider factors quite different than those they consider when reviewing denials
based upon unambiguous, trustee-adopted provisions. 4 4 Although
this difference in focus may itself be unobjectionable, 4 5 problems
arise when courts within these two categories of cases emphasize
different factors.
In Gaines v. Amalgamated InsuranceFund,4 6 for example, the Third
Circuit reviewed a fiduciary's interpretation of plan language that
served to deny a claimant her benefits. In sustaining the denial, the
court concluded that under the arbitrary and capricious test, a "plan
interpretation should be upheld even if the court disagrees with it,
so long as the interpretation is rationally related to a valid plan purpose and not contrary to the plain language of the plan."' 47 The
Gaines court's simplistic and highly deferential formulation of the
test contrasts with the Fifth Circuit's more sophisticated characterization in Dennard v. Richards Group, Inc. 48 The Dennard court reversed a district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of a
pension plan, stating "we are not convinced that the District Court
considered all factors possibly indicating arbitrary and capricious action by the [Administrative Retirement] Committee." 49 The court
42

See Maggard v. O'Connell, 671 F.2d 568, 571 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("'the concept of

"arbitrary and capricious" review defies generalized application' and must be contextually tailored") (quoting National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d

1031, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1979)); G. BOREN, QUALIFIED DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS
§ 16:07 (1983) ("An arbitrary and capricious standard is not self-explanatory.").
43 See, e.g., infra note 60.
44 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
45 Interpretation of plan language offers different opportunities for abuse than
does the decision to adopt a restrictive plan provision. A reviewing court must therefore
utilize different yardsticks to measure a fiduciary's exercise of discretion. See supra note
23 and accompanying text.
46
753 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1985).
47 Id. at 289.
48 681 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1982).
49
Id. at 314. The Dennard court rejected the district court's apparent formulation
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held that review of a fiduciary's interpretation of plan language
under the arbitrary and capricious test requires a comprehensive review of all relevant factors. It stated that a court should consider:
(1) whether a fiduciary's interpretation had been consistently applied in the past; (2) whether the interpretation was "fair" or reasonably derived from the plan's language; (3) whether an alternative
construction would impose "unanticipated costs;" and (4) whether
circumstances surrounding the denial indicated bad faith conduct by
the fiduciary. 50 The analysis sanctioned by Dennardin the plan interpretation context resembles a totality of the circumstances test, with
no one factor ensuring or precluding a finding of arbitrary and capricious treatment. The Dennard approach thus differs markedly
from the sort of review exemplified by Gaines, even though each proceeds under the same statute and purports to apply the same standard of review.
Similar difficulties arise in cases where unambiguous, trusteeadopted plan provisions provide the basis for benefit denials.5 1 The
courts applying the arbitrary and capricious test in this context have
adopted varying formulations as well. The Ninth Circuit has constructed the most stringent and elaborate version of the test. In a
series of cases originating under LMRA's "structural defect" analysis, 5 2 the Ninth Circuit has held that if a plan provision excludes a
"disproportionate number" of participants from benefits, "the burden shifts to the trustees to show a reasonable purpose for the exclusion." 5 3 Absent such a showing, the plan provision is deemed
arbitrary and capricious. Each of these Ninth Circuit cases individually shifted the burden of proving reasonableness to the trustees
when the disputed provision excluded particularly vulnerable
groups. 54 The cases' net effect, however, may be to require that
of the test, which would have required for reversal of the trustees' decision a showing by
the plaintiff that the trustees' interpretation was wholly implausible. Id.
50
Id. The court determined the good faith of the trustee by examining the plan's
internal consistency, relevant administrative regulations, and the factual background of
the case. Id.
51 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
Although ERISA covers all qualified employee benefit plans, the LMRA still
52
nominally regulates the structure of union-negotiated plans. The LMRA and ERISA
thus concurrently regulate union-negotiated plans. Courts, however, have interpreted
ERISA's fiduciary provisions to incorporate the standards developed under the LMRA.
See supra part I(B). Thus, there is little practical difference whether a case is brought
under ERISA or the LMRA, as the standard of review is the same under each statute. See
Gordon v. ILWU-PMA Benefit Funds, 616 F.2d 433, 438 (9th Cir. 1980).
53
Harm v. Bay Area Pipe Trades Pension Plan Trust Fund, 701 F.2d 1301, 1305
(9th Cir. 1983).
54 See, e.g., Elser v. I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund, 684 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1982) (provision denied benefits to employees who had worked significantly longer than employees
that received benefits), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 813 (1983); Burroughs v. Board of Trustees
of the Pension Trust Fund for Operating Eng'rs, 542 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1976) (newly
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where a plan provision excludes any group of employees, the plan's
bear the burden of proving the provision's
trustees
reasonableness. 55
In contrast, the Second Circuit follows a less rigorous version
of the test. In Valle v. Joint Plumbing Industry Board, the court described its standard:
In determining whether the particular application of a new
eligibility requirement was arbitrary and capricious, a number of
factors should be considered. They include the extent to which
the applicant was an intended beneficiary of the plan, the extent
to which the [trustee-adopted provision] retroactively strips the
beneficiary of significant service credit, the extent to which the
trustees have notified the employee of these and other changes in
rules, and the extent to which there is actuarial justification for
56
denying benefits in the particular case.
The vital distinction between the Ninth Circuit test and the Valle
standard is that the latter does not presume that an exclusive provision is arbitrary and capricious.5 7 The Second Circuit instead places
the burden upon the claimant to demonstrate, using specific evidence, that the challenged provision operates unfairly.
The Valle test is nonetheless more demanding than the
unimaginative standard the Tenth Circuit has apparently adopted.
In Mestas v. Huge58 the court required only that a challenged provision be "rational" to avoid the arbitrary and capricious label. It
adopted provision retroactively deprived employees of benefits without offering them
opportunity to comply with new provision's requirements), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096
(1977); Lee v. Nesbitt, 453 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1972) (provision excluded individuals
who had involuntarily experienced break in employment); see also Harm, 701 F.2d at 1305
(summarizing prior case law). These Ninth Circuit cases deal with specific types of plan
provisions that exclude discrete classes of individuals.
55 The court in Shishido v. SIU-Pac. Dist.-PMA Pension Plan, 587 F. Supp. 112
(N.D. Cal. 1983), presented the most liberal description of Ninth Circuit case law on this
issue: "The exclusion of employees from pension benefits without justification creates a
presumption that the pension plan is structurally defective" thus shifting the burden of
proving the provision's reasonableness to the trustee. Id. at 118. The Shishido court did
not qualify its use of the term "employees," thus apparently extending the doctrine to
any group of excluded claimants regardless of its size or characteristics. Indeed, the
"group" in Shishido consisted only of Mr. Shishido, who had failed to satisfy the plan's
service duration requirement because of an unconstitutional revocation of his merchant
mariner's certificate. The trustees refused to exercise their discretion to modify the duration requirements for "good cause" and grant Mr. Shishido's benefits. The court
found this action an arbitrary and capricious application of the "good cause" provision.
Id. at 119.
56 623 F.2d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 1980).
57 In discussing the extent to which fiduciaries have traditionally altered the eligibility requirements of plans, the court stated that "[a]ll of these [changes] may be reasonable responses to very real present and anticipated economic problems for the pension
fund. They are not presumed to be unreasonable .... " Id.
58 585 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1978).
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stated that "[w]here the trustees of a pension fund in setting eligibility standards have several rational alternatives, and select one and
reject the others, there is no basis for judicial intervention." 59
That the arbitrary and capricious test has taken so many forms
and been so inconsistently applied 60 indicates that it is no test at all.
Other than instilling a sense of deference to a fiduciary's claim denial, the test effectively permits courts to select whatever analysis
they deem appropriate. The need to add substance to an otherwise
empty test has bred confusion and inconsistency at the federal level
under a statute intended, among other things, to "bring a measure
of uniformity in an area where decisions under the same set of facts
may differ from state to state." 6 '
II
INAPPROPRIATENESS OF THE CURRENT ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS TEST

Despite its uncertain basis in ERISA 6 2 and its inconsistent application, 6 3 the highly deferential arbitrary and capricious test is
59 Id. at 453. See also Mum v. United Mine Workers, 718 F.2d 359, 361 (10th Cir.
1983) (court sustained benefit denial based on provision excluding strike time in com-

puting eligibility, stating, "[a]s in Mestas, the trustees chose one of several rational alternatives and in so doing rendered judicial intervention improper").
60
For example, compare the result in Wardle v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas
Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981) with that
in Richardson v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 645 F.2d 660 (8th Cir.
1981). In both cases, on virtually identical facts, the district courts applied the arbitrary
and capricious test to trustees' determinations that truck drivers were not "employees"
within the meaning of the plan's language. In both cases, the drivers were participants
in the same pension plan and were challenging the same provision. Several factors in
each case, primarily that each driver owned his own truck and was classified on his employer's books as an independent contractor, led the trustees to deny the benefit claims
of each on the grounds that both were "self employed."
In Wardle the Eighth Circuit upheld the benefit denial, yet in Richardson the Seventh
Circuit reversed the denial. Both applied the arbitrary and capricious test. The Richardson court sought to distinguish Wardle on the grounds that the driver in Wardle was not
subject to restrictions on the personal use of his truck or on the solicitation of business
elsewhere, while the company in Richardson "exercised almost complete control over
Richardson's job-related duties." 645 F.2d at 663. The Richardson court, in essence,
sought to distinguish Wardle because the driver in that case had the power to use his
truck outside of his immediate relationship with his employer. The Richardson court ignored, however, that the driver in Wardle "worked a minimum of 40 hours a week for
[his employer] and drove for no one else during that time." Wardle, 627 F.2d at 826. In
any event, the substantial factual identity of the two cases renders the distinction unpersuasive. See G. BOREN, supra note 42, § 16:07. Comparing these two cases illustrates the
malleability of the arbitrary and capricious test, and how it can lead to close scrutiny or
great deference depending on the disposition of the reviewing court.
61 HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 12, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 4650.
62 See supra part I(B).
63
See supra part I(C).
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firmly entrenched as the standard of review for benefit denials
under ERISA.6 4 Courts have offered several justifications, under
both the LMRA and ERISA, for adoption of the test. These justifications conflict with the fundamental policies and goals of ERISA.
Moreover, these justifications, and the broad deference they endorse, conflict with the deferred compensation theory of employee
benefit plans. Current application of the test heightens the inherent
tension between the deferred compensation theory and the unavoidable necessity of fiduciary benefit denials.
A.

Policies of ERISA

Courts adopting the arbitrary and capricious test justify its deference to fiduciary decisions in several ways. Numerous courts have
argued that the ultimate responsibility for plan administration must
lie with administrators, "whose experience is daily and continual,
65
not with judges whose exposure is episodic and occasional."
Other courts have stressed the goal of uniform plan administration,
deeming aggressive judicial review an obstacle to the consistent
treatment of plan participants. 66 The Third Circuit, however, in
Struble v. New Jersey Brewery Employees' Welfare Trust Fund 67 advanced
the most persuasive defense of the arbitrary and capricious test. In
contrasting the close judicial scrutiny of fiduciary investment decisions with the deference afforded a fiduciary's benefit claim decision, the court described the divergence in terms of the challenges
that each situation poses to fiduciary loyalty:
In actions by individual claimants challenging the trustees' denial
of benefits, the issue is not whether the trustees have sacrificed the
interests of the beneficiaries as a class in favor of some third
party's interests, but whether the trustees have correctly balanced
the interests of present claimants against the interests of future
claimants.... In such circumstances it is appropriate to apply the
more deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard to the trustees' decisions. In the [trustee investment situation], the gravamen
of the plaintiff's complaint is not that the trustees have incorrectly
balanced valid interests, but rather that they have sacrificed valid
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1006 (4th Cir. 1985). See also Ponce v.
Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 628 F.2d 537, 542 (9th Cir. 1980) ("trustees are
knowledgeable of the details of a trust fund (both its purpose and its operation), and
thus they are in a position to make prudent judgments concerning participant
eligibility").
66
See Holland v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1140, 1148 (4th Cir. 1985) (arbitrary and capricious test proper "whenever consistent administration of a pension plan
or welfare benefit plan covered by ERISA is at issue"), aff'd sub nom. Brooks v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 106 S. Ct. 3267 (1986).
67
732 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1984).
64
65
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interests to advance the interests of non-beneficiaries. 68

These defenses of the arbitrary and capricious test ignore the
fundamental principles and goals underlying ERISA's fiduciary provisions. Congress intended that ERISA dramatically alter prior law

regulating fiduciary behavior, of which the arbitrary and capricious

69
test for review of fiduciary benefit denials was an integral part.

Proponents of the arbitrary and capricious test avoid this problem
by arguing that the substantive fiduciary provisions contained in ERISA section 404(a)(1) primarily aim at a plan fiduciary's investment
decisions. 70 Under this view, ERISA's stringent7 express provisions govern investment behavior, while benefit claim decisions enjoy the traditional deference of the arbitrary and capricious test.
The Struble court's analysis seems grounded in this notion. The
court seems of the opinion that Congress sought close regulation of

fiduciary investment decisions because they present the possibility
of benefit to non-plan participants. Benefit claim decisions, on the
other hand, because they involve only the balancing of legitimate

competing interests in the plan's resources, did not command Congress's attention when it enacted section 404(a)(1).72 Like an outId. at 333-34.
See supra note 16 and accompanying text. ERISA's legislative history reveals
Congress's dissatisfaction with prior fiduciary law, citing the inadequacies of the Welfare
and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958), repealed by
ERISA § 111, 29 U.S.C. § 1031 (1982), the Labor Management Relations Act, the relevant sections of the Internal Revenue Code, and the common law of trusts. See HousE
REPORT, supra note 2, at 4, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4642. Congress noted:
The fact that statutory rules exist says little as to their efficacy in adjusting inequities that are visited upon plan participants ....
In almost
every instance, participants lose their benefits not because of some violation of federal law, but rather because of the manner in which the plan is
executed .... Courts strictly interpret the plan indenture and are reluctant to apply concepts of equitable relief or to disregard technical document wording."
Id. at 5, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws at 4643. Particularly damaging to
judicial perpetuation of the LMRA's arbitrary and capricious test under ERISA was Congress's complaint that the LMRA "is not intended to establish nor does it provide standards for the preservation of vested benefits, funding adequacy, security of investment,
orfiduiday conduct." Id. at 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws at 4642
(emphasis added).
70
See infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text, discussing Massachusetts Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Russell, 105 S. Ct. 3085 (1985).
71
Struble demonstrates that courts do interpret § 404(a)(1)'s express language to
impose upon investment decisions stricter fiduciary standards than the arbitrary and capricious test. The court recognized that "different fiduciary standards" apply in the investment and benefit claim context. 732 F.2d at 333. The court described how courts
have applied § 404(a)(1)'s explicit provisions to investment decisions, and then noted
that in the benefit claim scenario, "it is appropriate to apply the more deferential" arbitrary and capricious test. Id.
68
69

72 See id. at 333-34; see also Geib v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension &
Retirement Fund, 758 F.2d 973, 978 (3d Cir. 1985) ("[W]e recognize[] the sometimes
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sider to a family squabble, the Struble court appears to consider itself
unauthorized to intervene boldly in the "private," intrafund conflict
of the benefit claim denial.
The argument that the fiduciary benefit claim decision poses
less of a threat to a claimant's interests than an investment decision,
and thus deserves less judicial scrutiny, is flawed. First, ERISA's fiduciary provisions are nowhere explicitly limited to investment behavior. 73 Second, and more important, Congress sought with
ERISA "the protection of individual pension rights" 7 4 such that
"the private pension promise [would] become real rather than illusory."' 75 In light of this goal, courts reviewing fiduciary behavior
should emphasize the rights of individual claimants at least as much
as the possibility that improper benefits might flow to third parties.
The individual employee seeking benefits cares little whether a fiduciary's improper investment decision, rather than an unfair claim denial, renders those benefits unavailable. 7 6 In both situations the
claimant's pension promise has proven "illusory." Indeed, if any
difference exists, it is that the benefit claim decision is more vital to a
claimant's interests than the investment decision. A challenged
claim decision may deny a claimant's benefits completely, while an
imprudent investment will probably only diminish the level of benefits available. The benefit decision most directly determines
conflicting obligations of the trustees to preserve the financial security of a pension fund
and yet apply the assets to the greatest possible advantage for the beneficiaries ...
Partly because of these competing interests, trustees are given broad discretion to act,
and we reverse their actions only if they are arbitrary and capricious."); Edwards v.
Wilkes-Barre Publishing Co. Pension Trust, 757 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir.) ("Because the
trustees in [deciding a benefit claim] must reconcile competing interests of different
beneficiaries, the trustees' choice cannot be said to violate their fiduciary duty unless it is
arbitrary and capricious."), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 103 (1985).
78 See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
74
HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 1, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws
at 4639.
75 Id. at 10, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws at 4648.
76
Indeed, employers contributing to such funds may have an incentive to limit the
benefits paid to present claimants beyond their interest in assuring adequate funds to
satisfy future claimants. Upon the termination of an overfunded plan (i.e., one which
retains a surplus after satisfying the claims of all qualified beneficiaries) the excess
amount may revert back to the employer. See, e.g., Washington-Baltimore Newspaper
Guild Local 35 v. Washington Star Co., 555 F. Supp 257 (D.D.C. 1983) (surplus of terminated plan may revert to employer where plan funded solely by employer contributions), aff'd, 729 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Cf. Van Orman v. American Ins. Co., 680
F.2d 301, 307-08 (3d Cir. 1982) (employer's right to excess contributions limited by
ERISA § 4044(d)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(d)(2) (1982), which allows reversion only of employer contributions). A claim denial may therefore benefit a nonparticipant third party,
the employer, by increasing the likelihood that the plan may prove overfunded upon
termination. Given this potential benefit to the employer, affording great deference to
the benefit denial decision on the grounds that the decision involves solely a balancing of
present and future participants' interests in the plan's assets seems unwarranted.
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whether a claimant will receive his expected benefits.7 Given the
actual effect of the two types of decisions upon ERISA's intended
beneficiaries-individual employees-granting a fiduciary's benefit
claim decision significantly greater deference than that accorded his
plan asset investment decision seems inappropriate and illogical.
A discussion in a recent Supreme Court case, Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell,78 highlights the issue. Justice Stevens's majority opinion contains dicta that ERISA's fiduciary
obligations apply primarily to the management and investment of
plan assets. 7 9 In a separate opinion concurring in the majority's
narrow holding only, Justice Brennan 80 rebutted Justice Stevens's
characterization of ERISA's fiduciary obligations:
[S]ome of the Court's remarks are simply incompatible with the
structure, legislative history, and purposes of ERISA.
To the extent the Court suggests that administrators might
not be fully subject to strict fiduciary duties to participants and
beneficiaries in the processing of their claims ...I could not more

strongly disagree. 8 1
Justice Brennan noted that Congress clearly intended section 404 to
82
incorporate the fiduciary standards of the common law of trusts.
Moreover, he stated, "it is blackletter trust law that fiduciaries owe
77 This is not to propose that no balancing of future and present interests is appropriate. Indeed, one of the arguments of this section is that balancing, although necessary, should be consistent with the underlying rationale of employee benefit plans. The
current application of the arbitrary and capricious test fails to account for this underlying rationale. See infra sections II(B) and III. The argument above seeks only to demonstrate the illogic, given ERISA's goal of protecting individual pension interests along
with the interests of the plan itself, of according greater deference to a fiduciary's benefit
claim decision than to his investment decision.
78
105 S.Ct. 3085 (1985). For a discussion of the holding of the case and its implications, see Note, Participantand Beneficiary Remedies Under ERISA: Extracontractualand Punitive Damages After Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, 71 CORNELL L.
REV. 1014 (1986).
79 Justice Stevens wrote:
It is of course true that the fiduciary obligations of plan administrators are to serve the interests of participants and beneficiaries and, specifically, to provide them with the benefits authorized by the plan. But the
principal statutory duties imposed on the trustees relate to the proper
management, administration, and investment of fund assets, the maintenance of proper records, the disclosure of specified information, and the
avoidance of conflicts of interest.
105 S. Ct. at 3091.
80 Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmunjoined injustice Brennan's concurrence.
Id. at 3094.

81

Id. at 3095.

82 Id. at 3096. Although Justice Brennan's statements are substantially correct,
Congress noted that certain aspects of the common law of trusts were unacceptable
under ERISA, and were not to survive under the Act's fiduciary provisions. See supra
notes 14 & 69.
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strict duties running directly to beneficiaries in the administration
and payment of trust benefits."'8 3 Although not speaking directly to
the appropriateness of the arbitrary and capricious standard under
ERISA, Massachusetts Mutual clearly raises the issue by presenting the
opposing theories of fiduciary loyalty in the benefit claim context.
Congress's goals in enacting ERISA,8 4 along with the paramount
importance of the benefit decision to employees, justify the position
adopted by Justice Brennan, and demonstrate the impropriety of the
arbitrary and capricious test's excessive deference to a fiduciary's
claim decision.
B.

The Deferred Compensation Theory of Employee Benefit
Plans

Employee benefits plans, once considered little more than
spontaneous gifts from an employer to its employees,8 5 are now
widely regarded as a form of deferred compensation.8 6 Under the
105 S. Ct. at 3096.
See H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 303 (conference report) ("each fiduciary of a plan must act solely in the interests of the plan's participants and beneficiaries
and exclusively to provide benefits to these participants and beneficiaries"), reprintedin
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5038, 5083.
85 See, e.g., Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1944) ("The pension
plan of appellee railroad company was entirely voluntary, and its benefits were, as declared in the plan, gratuities."); W. GREENOUGH & F. KING, PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC
Poucy 35-38 (1976) (describing early judicial review of benefit claims denials); Rehon,
The Pension Expectation as ConstitutionalProperty, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 153, 168 (1980)
("[M]ost courts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries viewed noncontributory private pensions plans as mere gratuities granted at the sufferance of the employer
and revocable at any time for any reason."). For an early recognition of the deferred
compensation nature of pension benefits, see deRoode, Pension as Wages, 3 AM. ECON.
REv. 287 (1913) ("In order to get a full understanding of old-age and service pensions,
they should be considered a part of the real wages of a workman.... A pension system
... is really paid by the employee, not perhaps in money, but in the foregoing of an
increase in wages which he might obtain except for the establishment of a pension
system.").
86 The deferred compensation concept, although not universally or unconditionally
accepted, is currently the most popular theory to describe the nature of employee benefits. In terms of "the social and economic function of pensions in the employment relationship," the deferred compensation theory most accurately describes the expectations
and understandings of both employers and employees. Rehon, supra note 85, at 174-75.
In several areas of pension benefit law, the deferred compensation theory now provides
the conceptual foundation for determining the rights and obligations of beneficiaries.
For example, several states recognize in different contexts that an employee's interest in
his pension benefits (both vested and nonvested) is a form of property. See, e.g., In re
Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 845, 544 P.2d 561, 565, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 637
(1976) (because pension benefits are deferred compensation, they are property divisible
upon dissolution of a marriage); Estate of Schley, 100 Cal. App. 3d 161, 166-67, 161
Cal. Rptr. 104, 107 (1979) (for purposes of state inheritance taxes, nonvested pension
benefits are property interest under deferred compensation theory).
Several commentators also agree that pension benefits are a form of deferred compensation. See M. BERNSTEIN, THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 118-22 (1964) (describ83
84
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deferred compensation theory, an employer's establishment of a
pension plan is "an integral part of the entire wage structure, and
the character of the employee representative's interest in [his deferred benefit], and the terms of its grant, is no different than in any
other case where a change in the wage structure is effected." 8 7 Employer contributions to a plan represent the withholding of current
compensation for later payment when the claimant may more sorely
need the income or be in a lower tax bracket. The employee enjoys
a "right" to these deferred benefits in the same way that he enjoys a
"right" to current wages at the time he renders his services. 8 8 While
withheld, the employer invests the "wages" so as to accommodate
current and future employee claims.
The seminal case in the development of the deferred compensation theory is Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB. 89 In Inland Steel the Seventh
Circuit sustained a National Labor Relations Board determination
that pensions are "wages" within the meaning of the Wagner Act 90
and are therefore subject to compulsory collective bargaining. Accordingly, under Inland Steel collectively bargained benefit payments
are deemed to be deferred compensation. The reasoning of Inland
Steel, however, extends beyond the collective bargaining context.
The Inland Steel court clearly sought to characterize an employer's
pension promise as employee compensation:
ing justifications and reasons for adopting deferred compensation theory); W.
GREENOUGH & F. KING, supra note 85, at 154 ("Statements by employers about pensions
today frequently express the thought... that benefits are definitely a part of compensation even though.., dedicated to specific benefit purposes."); Somers & Schwartz, Pension and Welfare Plans: Gratuities or Compensation?,4 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 77, 87 (1950)
("When industry adopts a pension plan, in the hope of keeping its working force intact
...and advances it as an inducement for workers to take and stay on the job, and...
even to make concessions as to wages, it is doing things which reveal that its true...
attitude toward such plans is that they are part of the payment in its making to employees for the service rendered to them.").
Commentators that reject the deferred compensation theory do so primarily because of the lack of immediate vesting in most plans and the absence of a strict congruence between current wages foregone and benefits ultimately received. See D. LOGUE,
LEGISLATIVE INFLUENCE ON CORPORATION PENSION PLANS 18-22 (1979); D. McGILL, supra
note 9, at 19-20. Logue offers instead a "contingent claim" theory of pension plans
which holds, at the risk of oversimplification, that an employee does not value his potential benefit until he actually becomes vested under the plan's terms. D. LOGUE, supra, at
23-25. Logue's theory ignores what many proponents of the deferred compensation
theory emphasize: the promise of benefits provides significant inducement to the initial
acceptance of employment, and an employee's benefits hold value from the outset of the
employment relationship. See Somers & Schwartz, supra.
87 In re Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1, 4, enforced, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948),
cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
88 At least one commentator has proposed that a claimant's interest in his "deferred wages," at the time he makes his claim may be of constitutional stature under the
entitlement doctrine. See generally Rehon, supra note 85.
170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
89
90 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).

1986]

ERISA: REVIEWING CLAIM DENIALS

1005

It surely cannot be seriously disputed but that such a pledge [to
provide pensions] on the part of the company forms a part of the
consideration for work performed .... In this view, the pension
thus promised would appear to be as much a part of [an employee's] "wages" as the money paid him at the time of the rendition of his services. 9 1
Thus reasoned, Inland Steel supports the proposition that unilaterally
established plans, as well as collectively bargained plans, create the
92
promise of deferred compensation.
Finally, Congress itself implicitly endorsed the deferred compensation theory when it adopted ERISA. Although the Act grants
employers considerable flexibility when creating eligibility requirements, Congress mandated that employers cannot deny benefits
under a plan covered by ERISA to those employees that have completed ten years of service for a particular employer. 93 Noting this
development, one commentator has concluded that "ERISA, in
short, changes the nature of pensions in fundamental ways. It implicitly regards the deferred wages theory as correct, even though
the pension arrangements which many firms and employees have
' 94
agreed upon cannot be categorized this way."
A fundamental tension exists, however, between the deferred
compensation theory and the actual operation of modem employee
benefit plans. Most current employee benefits plans have intricate
eligibility systems which condition benefits upon a claimant's age,
length of service, and job stability. 95 These eligibility requirements
directly conflict with the concept of deferred compensation. According to one commentator, "If pensions are paid as compensation for
employee service, the concept of a complex eligibility system ...
seems like both a legal and a logical anomaly. It is difficult to imagine ... any other circumstances where eligibility is necessary to obtain wages rightfully earned." 9 6 Although a plan operating under a
"pure" deferred compensation theory would include full and immediate vesting, with nonforfeitable benefits accruing from the first day
91

170 F.2d at 253.
See M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 86, at 120-21 ("[N]ot only does Inland Steel stand
for the now well accepted proposition that employers must bargain with unions about
pensions, but the case equally stands for the frequently ignored proposition that a unilaterally (non-bargained) plan, and the contributions to it, are part of 'wages' and 'part
of the consideration for services performed.' ").
93 ERISA §§ 201-211, 29 U.S.C. 1051-1061 (1982).
94
D. LoGuE, supra note 86, at 62.
95 Typically a claimant must reach a certain age (usually 65), serve a certain number
of years with an employer or union, and spend those years of service without significant
interruption. See Rehon, supra note 85, at 195.
96 Id. at 176.
92
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of employment, few, if any, plans adopt such a system.9 7
Given the logical incompatibility of the deferred compensation
theory and eligibility requirements, the existence of these requirements can only be justified as a necessary modification of the theory
to guarantee a plan's actuarial health.9 8 This justification, in turn,
rests upon the premise that absent some means of denying benefits
to a portion of potential claimants, employers would hesitate to establish benefits plans. Because such plans are socially valuable,9 9 it
seems necessary to compromise somewhat the conceptual integrity
of the deferred compensation theory, and accept the existence of
exclusionary eligibility requirements.
The current application of the arbitrary and capricious test,
97

See Note, Pension Plans and the Rights of the Retired Worker, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 909,

920 n.54 (1970) ("[T]he deferred wages theory leads to the conclusion that rights vest
immediately upon employment and that benefits may not be forfeited even upon dismissal for cause or early termination of employment. This would follow since the benefits
have been 'earned' as wages and are the property of the employee irrespective of how
long he works.").
Several commentators have called for a requirement of immediate vesting, thereby
implicitly endorsing the notion that an employee's claim to benefits are a claim to
earned property. See, e.g., M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 86, at 173 ("the ultimate objective
[of pension reform] should be full and immediate vesting of private pensions for American workers, with no forfeiture of earned benefits"); Osgood, Qualifled Pension and ProfitSharing Plan Vesting: Revolution Not Reform, 59 B.U.L. REv. 452, 474 (1979) (calling for full
and immediate vesting for several reasons, among them that Congress intended with
ERISA to recognize that pension "promises made are to be treated as creating property
'rights' for the participants, and not as a conferral of gratuities by the employer").
98 See, e.g., Rehon, supra note 85, at 177 ("Nonetheless, whatever their justification,
the present function of eligibility requirements is to guarantee the actuarial soundness
of the plan."). Rehon notes that ERISA's minimum vesting and eligibility requirements
themselves recognize the tension between the deferred compensation theory and the
realities of pension plan operation. By accepting the existence of eligibility requirements, these provisions clearly contemplate such requirements' importance to the actual
operation of most plans; nonetheless, by establishing the maximum levels of exclusivity
that such requirements may impose, ERISA's participation and vesting provisions just as
clearly recognize an employee's right to a benefit. According to Rehon, these provisions
operate as a compromise "between the interests of employers and the investment community on the one hand, and the pension rights of employees on the other." Id. at 187.
With certain exceptions, ERISA § 202, 29 U.S.C. § 1052 (1982), requires qualified plans
to allow employees to participate in the plan upon completion of one year of service or
attainment of age 21, whichever is later. ERISA § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1982), establishes three vesting options which qualified plans may employ. The most popular
method is the one contained in § 1053(a)(2)(A), which requires that qualified plans recognize a nonforfeitable right to benefits upon an employee's completion of 10 years of
service. See Rehon, supra note 85, at 189.
99 Pension plans benefit society by providing financial security for the aged. One
commentator argues that the need to provide such security has grown increasingly
poignant in recent years as a result of four basic trends: (1) the growth in the number
and proportion of the aged population of the United States; (2) the decrease in employment opportunities for the aged; (3) the decreased capacity of the general public to save
for old age as a result of increased taxes and inflation; and (4) a general erosion in
society's concern with filial responsibility. D. McGiLL, supra note 9, at 3-6.
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however, only heightens the tension between eligibility requirements and the deferred compensation theory. First, the test's deference grants fiduciaries an inappropriate amount of discretion in
determining a claimant's rights to what are, in essence, earned
wages. In an employee's action against his employer for nonpayment of present wages, for example, the employer's decision would
certainly not be reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious test.
Second and more important, the various formulations of the test
now applied by courts bear no necessary relation to the actuarial
health of the plan in question. 0 0 Because concern for the plan's
long-term actuarial health offers the sole justification for restrictive
eligibility requirements, it is the only legitimate basis for denying
benefit claims. Courts nonetheless now consider a broad range of
factors under an arbitrary and capricious review.' 01 Consideration
of these factors obscures the fundamental nature of employee benefit plans: deferred compensation. Moreover, consideration of factors unrelated to a plan's actuarial health heightens the conflict
between eligibility requirements and the deferred compensation
theory. When nonactuarial factors determine the outcome under
arbitrary and capricious review, the fundamental (albeit necessary)
injustice of the benefit denial is needlessly magnified.
III
AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE CURRENT ARBITRARY AND

CAPRICIOUS TEST

The arbitrary and capricious test heightens the inherent tension
between the practice of imposing eligibility requirements and the
theory that pension benefits are deferred compensation. Practice
and theory coexist because most plans cannot supply benefits to all
who would otherwise qualify under a "pure" deferred compensation
theory. 0 2 The plan's actuarial health-the ability to ensure that
benefits are awarded to "as many intended employees as is economically possible"' 0 3 -may require the use of eligibility provisions to
deny some claimants' benefits. When an eligibility requirement denies a claimant's benefit, however, courts currently review the denial
100

See supra part I(C). Although courts have considered actuarial factors under the

test, they also base their decisions upon nonactuarial factors.
101 See, e.g., supra notes 48-50 (discussing Fifth Circuit's broad formulation of test in
Dennard).

102 See Rehon, supra note 85, at 177 ("Pension plans are deliberately funded to pay
benefits to only a small percentage of employees since it is felt that employers do not
have the wherewithal to provide adequate benefits to all covered employees. Plan administrators know that, statistically, only a minority of those workers covered at any
given time will comply with all provisions of the plan; it is fully expected that the rest will
quit, transfer or die prior to the vesting of their pension interest.").
103

Gaydosh v. Lewis, 410 F.2d 262, 266 (D.C. Cir. 1969).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

1008

[Vol. 71:986

under a standard that often ignores the plan's actuarial stability. Judicial review of benefit claim denials under the arbitrary and capricious test frequently overlooks this sole legitimate justification for
the claim denial itself.
This section proposes an alternative test for review of fiduciary
benefit claim denials under ERISA. This proposed test would replace the arbitrary and capricious test as the method for determining whether a fiduciary's decision to deny a claim was made "solely
in the interest" of the plan's participants. 10 4 The proposed test furthers the protective goals of ERISA's fiduciary provisions. 10 5 It also
harmonizes, to the greatest extent possible, judicial review of claim
denials based upon eligibility requirements with the deferred compensation theory of employee benefit plans. 10 6 Under the proposed
test, a reviewing court would sustain a fiduciary's claim denial in two
situations: (1) when the denial is based upon an unambiguous,
trustee-adopted provision, and the fiduciary can show an actuarial
need for the provision; or (2) when the denial is based upon ambiguous plan language, and the administrator can show that adoption
of the claimant's reasonable reading would pose an actuarial threat
10 7
to the plan's health.
This test would require an analysis different from the current
arbitrary and capricious test in two fundamental ways. 108 First, in
104

105
106
107

See supra note 39.
See supra part H(A).
See supra part l1(B).

The two prongs of the proposed test correspond with the two fundamental ways
in which a fiduciary's exercise of discretion may produce a benefit denial. See supra note
23 and accompanying text.

108
The plaintiff's (the denied claimant's) complaint would likely determine whether
a given case falls within the first or second prong of the proposed test. To bring a case
within the first prong, the plaintiff might concede (or the parties might stipulate) the
validity of the construction that the trustee relied upon in denying the claim, thereby
implicitly characterizing the provision as "unambiguous." The plaintiff would then challenge the actuarial necessity of the provision as such, placing the burden upon the
trustee to justify the provision by a preponderance of the evidence.
To challenge a provision within the second prong, the plaintiff might allege that the
trustee misconstrued the plan's language in denying a claim. If the plaintiff can offer a
reasonable alternative reading, the burden would shift to the trustee to justify his or her
reading by a preponderance of the evidence. The proposed test would not allow a plaintiff to prevail under both prongs. Under the proposed test, when a trustee meets his
burden under one prong, he has met his burden under the test.
Conceivably, the proposed test could offer the plaintiff a means of avoiding Robinson's prohibition against challenges to trustee implementation of collectively bargained
provisions. See supra note 10. Arguably, a plaintiff could allege that a trustee, rather
than applying an unambiguous, collectively bargained provision, misinterpreted the
provision and denied the plaintiff's claim on that basis. There is little practical likelihood of this occurring, however. To fall within the second prong, a plaintiff must offer a
"reasonable" alternative to the trustee's construction. When a trustee is applying an
unambiguous, collectively bargained provision, a plaintiff would be hard pressed to provide a "reasonable" alternative application. On the other hand, where the plaintiff can

1986]

ERISA: REVIEWING CLAIM DENIALS

1009

accordance with ERISA's protective intent, the proposed test would
remove the presumption of reasonableness that now cloaks a fiduciary's decision to deny a benefit claim. A fiduciary's reasonable reading of plan language would not automatically prevail over the
claimant's reasonable reading. 10 9 Nor could a fiduciary merely
point to the prior application of an unduly restrictive, trusteeadopted provision and assert the need for consistent plan administration in denying a claimant's challenge." 0 Instead, the challenged
fiduciary would bear the burden of demonstrating, in actuarialterms,
the need for the disputed provision or interpretation."'
Second, the proposed test would focus the review inquiry upon
its proper object-the plan's actuarial health. The test pares the debate over a benefit denial to the only issue permissible under the
deferred compensation theory: whether the fiduciary's denial is necessary to protect the plan's health and the interests of present and
future claimants.'12
At first glance, the proposed test seems likely to produce significandy more judicial reversals of fiduciary benefit denials than are
now granted."x 3 To some extent this would be true. A number of
provide a "reasonable" application, the trustee has probably exercised discretion in applying the plan's language; hence, analysis under the second prong is proper.
109 See, e.g., Lowenstern v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
479 F.2d 1211, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("[A]s between two competing interpretations of
the Plan, we are bound by that of the Administrators if it is not arbitrary and capricious."); Miniard v. Lewis, 387 F.2d 864, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (The claimant "calls upon
us to decide which of the two competing interpretations is more reasonable .... This
we may not do. Since the trustees' interpretation is a reasonable one, its application...
was not arbitrary and capricious."), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 873 (1968).
110 See, e.g., Bueneman v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 572 F.2d
1208, 1210 (8th Cir. 1978) ("In light of the trustees' policy of consistently refusing retroactive participation coupled with the rather explicit language of the Participation
Agreement, we are convinced that the trustees did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in
rejecting [the employee's claim].").
111 The basic preponderance of the evidence standard would apply. See supra note
108. This Note does not address what types of evidence might be used to support or
refute the actuarial justification for a particular claim denial. The evidence should generally relate to the concerns described supra note 9. An obvious source of information,
however, would be the annual actuarial statement required of most plans by ERISA
§ 103(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1023(d) (1982). That section requires, as part of a plan's annual
report, disclosure of the plan's expected costs in relation to its current plan population,
a valuation of the plan's assets, and the actuarial assumptions used to assess the overall
health of the plan.
112 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
113 The proposed test also seems likely to foster litigation over trustee benefit denials. This potential problem should be ameliorated, however, when the trustees have
succeeded in establishing the actuarial necessity of the challenged provision or interpretation in prior litigation. Summaryjudgment in favor of the trustees would be appropriate in such cases. Conceivably, after several challenges to a plan's exclusionary
provisions or trustees' established interpretations of those provisions, individual plans
could become virtually immune from attack. Litigation under the proposed test would
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cases, however, have already applied the proposed test in substance,
although nominally applying the traditional arbitrary and capricious
test. In Fine v. Semet, 114 for example, the Eleventh Circuit sustained
a trustee's decision to deny a claimant's request for an immediate
lump sum payment of his accrued benefits. The trustees relied
upon a clause granting them "sole discretion" to deny such requests, despite the fact that the claimant was one hundred percent
vested in his benefits. 1 15 The court purported to apply the conventional arbitrary and capricious test in reviewing the denial. 1 6 However, both the majority and the dissent in fact limited their review to
the actuarial question of whether the trustees' exercise of their "sole
discretion" to deny the claim was necessary to protect the plan's
financial health. The majority concluded that the trustees had offered sufficient actuarial justification for their decision. The dissent,
however, called for a more searching actuarial review, arguing that
the evidence had not clearly established that payment of the claim
"would have had [an] adverse impact on the fund and on the interests of the plans' other participants and beneficiaries." ' 17 Whether
the majority's decision was correct or not, the importance of Fine
lies in the court's concentrating its review upon actuarial considerations. Both the majority and the dissent properly shifted the burden
force the trustees to reshape their plan and actuarially justify all of its potentially exclusionary provisions.
114 699 F.2d 1091 (llthCir. 1983).
115 Cases like Fine, in which a denial of the claimed benefit occurs pursuant to a
clause granting the fiduciary "sole discretion" to grant or deny the request, do not appear to fit within either prong of the proposed test. On the one hand, a fiduciary is
acting pursuant to an unambiguous provision, albeit one directing him to exercise his
discretion; hence the fiduciary's power to deny a claim is indisputable. On the other
hand, one can argue that the fiduciary is interpreting the "sole discretion" clause to
require a denial on the case's particular facts.
Although Fine-type denials might fall within either prong, it seems best to classify
them under the second interpretation of plan language prong. This avoids immunizing
a fiduciary's exercise of "sole discretion" from judicial review in situations where the
"sole discretion" clause was collectively bargained. Under United Mine Workers Health
& Retirement Funds v. Robinson, 455 U.S. 562 (1982), the application of a collectively
bargained provision cannot be challenged for reasonableness. See supra note 10. Given
that a fiduciary's decision under a "sole discretion" clause, whether collectively bargained or not, involves an exercise of the type of discretion that Congress intended
ERISA's fiduciary provisions to regulate, courts should review Fine-type cases under the
second prong of the proposed test. For a case involving a "sole discretion" clause
outside the lump sum context, see Shishido v. SIU-Pac. Dist.-PMA Pension Plan, 587 F.
Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1983). Shishido is particularly intriguing because the court, like the
court in Fine, used exclusively actuarial considerations in reviewing a fiduciary's decision
under a "sole discretion" clause. The court concluded that the claim denial was not
actuarially justified and reversed the fiduciary's decision. See supra note 55.
116 699 F.2d at 1095 ("[Wle focus on whether the trustees' articulated reasons for
their treatment of Semet's request were so insufficient as to make their actions arbitrary
and capricious.").
117 Id. at 1096 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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to the trustees to show an actuarial need for the challenged denial.
The majority concluded that they had met that burden, while the
'dissent believed they had not.
Although cases like Fine v. Semet would probably be decided the
same way under the proposed test, a number of other cases might
not. For example, application of the first prong of the test might
have produced a different decision in Miranda v. Audia." 8 In Miranda the Ninth Circuit considered a challenge to a trustee-adopted
fifteen-year minimum service rule. The plaintiffs, representing a
class of plan participants employed in the construction industry,
proved at trial that under the fifteen-year service requirement
"[o]ver 96% of the employees for whom contributions have been
made never receive a pension."1 1 9 The plaintiffs advocated instead
a ten-year service requirement. In sustaining the fifteen-year requirement adopted by the trustees, the Miranda court cited several
factors, including the construction industry's highly erratic work
patterns, the relaxation of the plan's eligibility requirements in
other areas, and the fact that reducing the service requirement to
ten years would award benefits to only 445 workers out of the plan's
30,000 total participants.' 20 According to the court, these factors
rendered the fifteen-year requirement reasonable, rather than arbitrary and capricious.
The Mirandacourt did not discuss actuarial issues. The trustees
were not required to justify the fifteen-year service requirement
through reference to the long-term financial interests of the plan.
Indeed, one of the factors underlying the court's decision-that a
ten-year requirement would benefit only 445 out of 30,000 participants-seemingly supports the notion that the fifteen-year requirement was not actuariallyjustified. 12 1 To reach such a conclusion, of
course, would require elaboration of the actuarial issues at the trial
level. Miranda is important because the court sustained a highly exclusionary provision without any such elaboration. The proposed
test, on the other hand, would require that a court fully explore the
actuarial issues, because they would constitute the sole basis for
decision.
Similarly, the proposed test's second prong might produce different results in other cases. In Pokratz v. Jones Dairy Farm 22 the
Seventh Circuit rejected a claimant's contention that his chronic de118

681 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1982).

119

Id. at 1125.

Id. at 1125-26.
That a plan with 30,000 contributing participants would be damaged by the inclusion of a mere 445 additional claimants to the plan's benefit rolls seems unlikely. See
supra note 9.
122
771 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1985).
120
121
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pression rendered him "disabled" as that term was used in the plan,
allegedly entitling him to plan benefits. Despite the Social Security
Administration's determination that the claimant was disabled, the
court upheld the trustees' determination that he was not. Requiring
only that the decision be "reasoned," the court held the denial not
arbitrary and capricious.12 3 The Pokratz court did not discuss actuarial issues; nowhere did the court ask whether the claimant's reasonable reading posed a threat to the plan's financial soundness. Under
the proposed test, however, actuarial issues would provide the sole
grounds for decision; the trustees would have to demonstrate that
interpreting "disabled" to cover chronic depression would create an
actuarial threat to the plan. The result in Pokratz is not clearly
wrong under the proposed test, 124 given that the court failed to ask
the proper questions. The court's analysis would be improper, however, and would give way in this case to a more focused inquiry limited to actuarial issues.
Although the proposed test better protects claimants' interests
than does the current arbitrary and capricious test, it does not proceed from the premise that most trustee-adopted eligibility requirements, or trustees' interpretations of eligibility requirements, lack
actuarial justification. The proposed test seeks only to distinguish
those that are not justified from those that are, and uphold denials
based upon the latter. The current arbitrary and capricious test,
variously formulated and inconsistently applied, is not so discriminating and should be abandoned as a means of determining whether
a fiduciary's claim denial was "solely in the interest" of plan participants.' 25 The proposed test recognizes that eligibility requirements
exist as a necessary imperfection in the deferred compensation theory. But in reviewing denials based upon trustee-adopted eligibility
123 Id. at 209 ("When it is possible to offer a reasoned explanation, based on the
evidence, for a particular outcome, that outcome is not arbitrary or capricious.").
Although the Social Security Administration's determination that Mr. Pokratz was disabled does not prove the trustee's contrary decision was wrong, since each agency may
have used different criteria, it does suggest that more aggressive judicial review might
have overturned the benefit denial.
124 It appears unlikely, however, that Mr. Pokratz represented a significant class of
chronically depressed employees. Characterizing him as "disabled" would probably not
have subjected the plan to an actuarially dangerous number of disability claims based
upon chronic depression.
125 One suggestion might be to adopt the proposed test in substance, while retaining the "arbitrary and capricious" label. This seems to have been the Fine court's approach. To do so, however, would be wholly inconsistent with the typical articulation of
the arbitrary and capricious test. In Pokratz, the court described the test: "Although it is
an overstatement to say that a decision is not arbitrary or capricious whenever a court
can review the reasons stated for the decision without a loud guffaw, it is not much of an
overstatement." 771 F.2d at 209. The proposed test is more rigorous, in that it rejects a
trustee's reasonable decision when that decision is not actuarially justified in favor of a
claimant's reasonable challenge.
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requirements, or trustees' interpretations of eligibility requirements, the proposed test does something that the arbitrary and capricious test does not. It ensures that a fiduciary will employ such
requirements in a manner consistent with the sole justification for
their existence-protection of the plan's financial health.
CONCLUSION

Under ERISA's fiduciary provisions, of which section 404(a) (1)
is the centerpiece, courts have developed a two-tiered system to review fiduciary behavior. On the one hand, courts review a fiduciary's investment decisions according to the express, stringent
language of section 404(a)(1). On the other hand, courts review fiduciary administrative decisions, in particular the decision to deny a
benefit claim, under a highly deferential arbitrary and capricious
test.
The current arbitrary and capricious test is inappropriate for
two reasons. First, it permits a fiduciary far too much discretion in
making a decision so vital to a claimant's interests. This broad discretion conflicts with the fundamental goals and policies of ERISA.
Second, the test allows a court to sustain a benefit denial on the
basis of factors that ignore the conceptual foundation for employee
benefit plans, the deferred compensation theory.
This Note advocates an alternative, actuarially based test that
significantly limits the deference currently afforded a fiduciary's decision to deny a benefit claim. By forcing fiduciaries to justify benefit denials upon actuarial grounds alone, the proposed test offers
claimants greater protection against unjust benefit denials. Furthermore, the test minimizes the inherent tension between plan eligibility requirements and the deferred compensation theory. It
recognizes the paramount position actuarial considerations must occupy in the establishment and application of eligibility requirements, given that actuarial concerns alone justify the very existence
of the requirements.
Bradley R. Duncan

